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NEW YORK COURTS EMERGENCY ALERTS

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New York Court Emergency Alerts provides users with critical, emergency related information and notifications such as court closings, delayed openings, or other emergency conditions. Effective on or about March 15, 2020, the court system will no longer use Twitter to send out emergency notices.

So to sign up for the new system, see this link: http://www.nycourts.gov/notice/emergency-alerts.shtml

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NOTICE OF ENTRY

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Receiving a favorable order still requires a notice of entry. A party must serve a copy of an order or judgment "and written notice of its entry" (CPLR 5513[b]) to start the time limit for moving for leave to appeal from that order or judgment. But it also starts the time limit for other procedures, like in CPLR 3211 (f).

Citibank, N.A. v Brook, 2020 NY Slip Op 01142, Decided on February 19, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"In March 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the defendants Jacqueline Brooks and Glen F. Brooks (hereinafter together the defendants) to foreclose a mortgage executed by them. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and the motion was denied in an order dated December 16, 2016 (see Citibank, N.A. v Brooks, ___ AD3d ___ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2017-04077; decided herewith]). By notice of motion dated August 14, 2017, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference, asserting that the defendants had defaulted in responding to the summons and complaint. The attorney affirmation submitted in support of the motion did not, in its discussion of the procedural history, disclose the prior motion practice. It did not mention the December 2016 order and did not assert that such order had been served with notice of entry, even though such service was necessary in order to trigger the running of the defendants' time to respond to the complaint (see CPLR 3211[f]). The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion. Jacqueline Brooks (hereinafter the appellant) appeals.

In order to obtain a default judgment against the appellant and an order of reference, the plaintiff was required to submit evidence of service of a copy of the summons and complaint, evidence of the facts constituting the cause of action to foreclose the mortgage, and evidence that the appellant failed to appear or answer within the time allowed (see RPAPL 1321[1]; CPLR 3215[f]; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Grinkorn, 172 AD3d 1183, 1185; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Movtady, 165 AD3d 1025, 1026; 21st Mtge. Corp. v Palazzotto, 164 AD3d 1293, 1294). While the defendants did not submit an answer to the complaint, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendants were in default in responding to the complaint in that the plaintiff did not assert that the [*2]plaintiff served the order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss with notice of entry. Without service of the order with notice of its entry, the time within which the defendants were required to answer the complaint did not begin to run (see CPLR 3211[f]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion were for leave to enter a default judgment against the appellant and for an order of reference."

ANOTHER UNLICENSED CONTRACTOR CASE

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Gomez v. Ralph, NYLJ February 20, 2020, Date filed: 2020-02-04, Court: Civil Court, Bronx Judge: Judge Bianka Perez, Case Number: CV-022411-19/BX:

"FINDINGS OF FACT
As per the plaintiff’s testimony, the plaintiff is an unlicensed contractor who was contracted to do work at the defendant’s premises. Plaintiff testified the defendant asked him to remove and replace shingles and to remove and replace the gutters. Plaintiff stated he did 95 percent of the work. The contract price per the Plaintiff was $17,000.00. Plaintiff states he was only paid $5,000.00. Plaintiff admits not having a license to do the work. He said he has worked on many projects for the defendant. Receipts for supplies were admitted into evidence as Plaintiff’s 1-5. Plaintiff did not have a copy of the contract.

Defendant states the contract price was $12,000.00 and he paid plaintiff $10,500.00. He states he has used the plaintiff for many jobs for over 20 years. Defendant produced his copy of the contract in evidence as Defendant’s A.

The defendant states he paid plaintiff $10,500.00 for the work performed and has submitted in evidence as Defendant’s A the receipts for payments received, Deposit of $2,000.00 on 9/9/19, payment of $2,000.00 on 9/10/19, payment of $1,000.00 on 9/16/19, payment of $2,000.00 on 9/20/19, $950.00 for materials, $850.00 for garbage disposal, and $1,650.00 for gutter on 10/4/19.
Defendant states that the plaintiff started the work but did not finish because he wanted more money. Defendant states that after a month of calling the plaintiff to finish the work he hired another contractor to finish the job and paid $7,000.00, receipt in evidence as Defendant’s B.

According to the plaintiff, the defendant told him not to come to work during the Jewish holidays and when he returned to finish the work, he was told not to do any further work by defendant’s daughter. Seven photographs of the work were marked as Plaintiff’s 6.

The plaintiff seeks a money judgment for the balance due for work performed in the amount of $12,000.00.

DISCUSSION
CPLR 3015(e) requires a home improvement contractor to be duly licensed prior to commencing a cause of action against a consumer for payment for services rendered. This regulatory scheme protects homeowners from abuses and fraudulent practices by persons engaged in the home improvement business (see, Millington v. Rapoport, 98 A.D.2d 765, 469 N.Y.S.2d 787).

CPLR 3015(e) states as follows:

“License to do business. Where the plaintiff’s cause of action against a consumer arises from the plaintiff’s conduct of a business which is required by state or local law to be licensed by the department of consumer affairs of the city of New York….., the complaint shall allege, as part of the cause of action, that plaintiff was duly licensed at the time of services rendered and shall contain the name and number, if any, of such license and the governmental agency which issued such license. The failure of the plaintiff to comply with this subdivision will permit the defendant to move for dismissal pursuant to paragraph seven of subdivision (a) of rule thirty-two hundred eleven of this chapter.”

The failure to comply with the statute can lead to draconian results, such as a subcontractor being precluded from receiving payment for a job well done. As stated in Kristeel, Inc. v. Seaview Development Corporation, 165 A.D.3d 1243, 87 N.Y.S.3d 600 (2d Dept 2018), where the Second Department revered supreme court and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.
Thus, as the plaintiff has failed to properly plead his complaint and the plaintiff has admittedly performed work without a license. The matter is hereby dismissed."

COUPLE'S ESTATE ATTORNEY CAUGHT IN DIVORCE

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A question of ethics may also exist if the 2016 services affected a mutual estate plan of the 2013 services...would the attorney have the obligation to tell the wife in 2016 that her husband changed the estate plan they both created jointly in 2013?

Feighan v Feighan, 2020 NY Slip Op 01146, Decided on February 19, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"In 2013, the parties retained Eugenia M. Vecchio, Esq., to create certain estate planning documents, including the 2013 Robert E. Feighan Revocable Trust. In 2016, prior to the commencement of this action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant retained Vecchio to create the 2016 Robert E. Feighan Revocable Trust, a trust funded by assets previously held in the 2013 Robert E. Feighan Revocable Trust. The Supreme Court, inter alia, in effect, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for the issuance of a subpoena to Vecchio for copies of the complete files of the plaintiff and the defendant relating to the 2013 Robert E. Feighan Revocable Trust and the 2016 Robert E. Feighan Revocable Trust. The defendant appeals.

"The attorney-client privilege shields from disclosure any confidential communications between an attorney and his or her client made for the purpose of obtaining or facilitating legal advice in the course of a professional relationship" (Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 NY3d 616, 623; see CPLR 4503[a][1]). Since this privilege shields pertinent information from disclosure, it must be narrowly construed (see Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 NY3d at 624). "The party asserting the privilege bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to protection by showing that the communication at issue [*2]was between an attorney and a client for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal advice or services, in the course of a professional relationship,' that the communication is predominantly of a legal character, that the communication was confidential and that the privilege was not waived" (id., quoting Rossi v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 73 NY2d 588, 593-594).

Generally, when an attorney represents two or more parties with respect to the same matter, the attorney-client privilege may not be invoked to protect confidential communications concerning the joint matter in subsequent adverse proceedings between the clients (see Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner & Landis, 89 NY2d 123, 137; Wallace v Wallace, 216 NY 28, 35; Matter of McCormick, 287 AD2d 457, 457). Here, Vecchio's joint representation of the parties in 2013 with respect to the preparation of estate planning documents, including 2013 revocable trusts executed by each of them, constituted representation with respect to the same matter, and we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the attorney-client privilege could not be invoked to protect confidential communications concerning Vecchio's representation of the parties with regard to the defendant's 2013 revocable trust (see Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner & Landis, 89 NY2d at 137; Wallace v Wallace, 216 NY at 35; Matter of McCormick, 287 AD2d at 457-458). However, contrary to the court's determination, the attorney-client privilege could be invoked to protect confidential communications concerning Vecchio's representation of the defendant with regard to the 2016 revocable trust, as Vecchio's representation of the plaintiff ended in 2013, and the services provided to the defendant in 2016 did not constitute the same matter as the services provided to the parties in 2013."

POST - DIVORCE: DEFAULT CURED ONLY AFTER MOTION MADE REQUIRED PAYMENT OF EXPENSES AS PER AGREEMENT

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A contract is a contract.

Tara W. v. Yitzchok W., NYLJ February 24, 2020,  Date filed: 2020-02-18, Court: Supreme Court, Kings, Judge: Justice Delores Thomas:

"As to that branch of plaintiff’s motion which seeks an order directing defendant to pay her $2,500 which she paid to Mr. Berfas in connection with preparing the instant motion, it is well established that “[w]here the parties have agreed to provisions in a settlement agreement that govern the award of attorney’s fees, the agreement’s provisions, rather than statutory provisions, control” (Roth v. Roth, 116 AD3d 833, 834 [2d Dept 2014]; see also Fenster v. Fenster, 107 AD3d 933, 933 [2d Dept 2013]; Sweeney v. Sweeney, 71 AD3d 989, 992 [2d Dept 2010]; Rubio v. Rubio, 70 AD3d 805, 806 [2d Dept 2010]; Matter of Berns v. Halberstam, 46 AD3d 808, 809 [2d Dept 2007]; Arato v. Arato, 15 AD3d 511, 512 [2d Dept 2005]). Here, article 15 of the settlement agreement expressly obligated a party who defaulted with respect to any obligation set forth therein to pay the other party his or her reasonable attorney’s fees and related expenses and costs incurred in commencing and maintaining an action or proceeding to enforce such obligation.

It has been established that defendant defaulted with respect to: (1) his obligation under article 35 of the settlement agreement to execute the deed to the marital residence and all ancillary recording documents; (2) his obligation under article 36 of the settlement agreement to pay $3,000 to plaintiff as his share of the water bills; and (3) his obligation under article 29 of the settlement agreement to provide proof that he maintained a life insurance policy of $1,000,000 to secure his support obligations. It was only after plaintiff filed her motion that defendant agreed to cure these defaults by him. Thus, pursuant to article 15 of the settlement agreement, defendant, as the defaulting party, was contractually obligated to pay plaintiff such reasonable attorney’s fees and related expenses or costs incurred by plaintiff in bringing this motion to enforce these articles of the settlement agreement (see Fackelman v. Fackelman, 71 AD3d 724, 726 [2d Dept 2010]; Leiderman v. Leiderman, 50 AD3d 644, 644-645 [2d Dept 2008]; Sieratzki v. Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552, 554 [2d Dept 2004]).

While plaintiff gave defendant written notice of his default by email, rather than by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by overnight delivery service to defendant, as set forth in article 15 of the settlement agreement, plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with this notice requirement is not fatal to plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and related expenses or costs because defendant does not dispute that he received actual notice of his defaults, and he was not, in any way, prejudiced as a result of this minimal deviation (see Suarez v. Ingalls, 282 AD2d 599, 600 [2d Dept 2001]). Rather, defendant had actual notice of plaintiff’s numerous requests for compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement, but he refused these requests, necessitating plaintiff’s filing of this motion (see id.; Dellicarri v. Hirschfeld, 210 AD2d 584, 585 [3d Dept 1994]; Heischober v. Heischober, 53 Misc 3d 146[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51600[U], *1-2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]).
Defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees because she did not provide a statement of net worth or an affidavit detailing her financial ability to pay such fees. Such argument is rejected since plaintiff’s request for fees is based on article 15 of the settlement agreement, rather than Domestic Relations Law §237 (see Garcia v. Garcia, 104 AD3d 806, 807 [2d Dept 2013]; Matter of Milark v. Meigher, 56 AD3d 1018, 1021 [3d Dept 2008]). Defendant also argues that plaintiff did not provide a cancelled check or a paid receipt for funds allegedly expended. Plaintiff, however, as noted above, provided the retainer agreement and Mr. Berfas’ affirmation, showing the amount paid by her.

In addition, it is noted that plaintiff does not characterize her request as seeking attorney’s fees, and states that she retained Mr. Berfas’ law firm and its associates as “consultants” to prepare her instant order to show cause based on defendant’s failure to adhere to the settlement agreement. Plaintiff refers to Mr. Berfas’ fees as being for “legal consulting and document preparation” and as “consulting fees,” and states that she is representing herself pro se. However, article 15 of the settlement agreement broadly encompasses “reasonable attorney’s fees and related expenses or costs” in connection with enforcing the settlement agreement. The court finds that the $2,500 sought by plaintiff falls within the ambit of this article. Plaintiff incurred these fees due to defendant’s refusal to comply with the settlement agreement and the need for court intervention before obtaining his cooperation. Defendant did not agree to sign the deed or pay the $3,000 until after this motion was brought.

Defendant asserts that “one might ask how it is reasonable to expend $2500.00 [to Mr. Berfas] to recoup $3,000.” Plaintiff, however, was not merely seeking $3,000, but also for defendant to sign the deed transferring the marital residence, which defendant had refused to do for approximately one year. Defendant did not request a hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of the amount of the fees to be awarded, and did not object to the resolution of the issue based on written submissions. Thus, defendant waived the right to a hearing on this issue (see Rosner v. Rosner, 143 AD3d 884, 885 [2d Dept 2016]). Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, where plaintiff was compelled to bring a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement, the court finds that pursuant to article 15 of the settlement agreement, defendant must be required to pay plaintiff the reasonable amount of $2,500 as expenses incurred by her in enforcing defendant’s obligations under the settlement agreement (see Mollah, 136 AD3d at 994; Martin v. Martin, 92 AD3d 646, 646 [2d Dept 2012])."

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE- SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED

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Reviewing this case on e courts, this foreclosure has been through several litigated motions. And even while the appeal of the 2017 decision was pending, the bank, in August 2019, applied for an order of reference and the homeowner cross-moved for a stay pending the appeal. Both motions were eventually withdrawn.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Bakth, 2020 NY Slip Op 01382, Decided on February 26, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"On its motion, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Achwad Bakth (hereinafter the defendant) and for an order of reference, the plaintiff, to establish its standing to commence this mortgage foreclosure action, submitted an affirmation of Amber A. Jurek, a lawyer with Gross Polowy, LLC (hereinafter Gross Polowy), the plaintiff's counsel. Jurek stated that she was familiar with Gross Polowy's records and record-keeping practices. Jurek stated that on January 28, 2015, Gross Polowy received the plaintiff's file, which included the original endorsed note. Gross Polowy commenced this action on the plaintiff's behalf on February 26, 2015. According to Jurek, "[o]n that date, Gross Polowy, on behalf of Plaintiff, remained in physical possession of the collateral file, including the original endorsed Note dated March 20, 2012." The plaintiff also submitted the note, which bore an undated endorsement to the plaintiff. However, Jurek did not set forth any facts based on her personal knowledge to support her statement that the note in the plaintiff's file was the original endorsed note. Further, the plaintiff failed to attach the business records upon which Jurek relied in her affirmation, and since Jurek did not state that she personally witnessed Gross Polowy receive the plaintiff's file, her statement is inadmissible hearsay (see Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Brottman, 173 AD3d 1139; cf. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Gonzalez, 174 AD3d 555; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon, 171 AD3d 197, 206-207).

The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of April H. Hatfield, vice president of loan documentation for the plaintiff. Hatfield stated that she was familiar with the plaintiff's records and record-keeping practices. Although Hatfield attached the records upon which she relied, she did not [*2]state that the plaintiff had possession of the endorsed note at the time the action was commenced. Rather, she relied on Jurek's affidavit for that fact. Accordingly, Hatfield's affidavit was also insufficient to establish the plaintiff's standing.

Finally, the plaintiff did not attach a copy of the note to the complaint when commencing this action. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing to commence this action, and those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and for an order of reference should have been denied."

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE - FORUM SHOPPING?

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By staying out of state courts, the foreclosure process can be accelerated. Here, the bank made the choice in the middle of the state court litigation - and it was allowed.

Onewest Bank, FSB v Jach, 2020 NY Slip Op 01357, Decided on February 26, 2020 ,Appellate Division, Second Department:

"In July 2007, the defendant Adam Jach executed a note in the sum of $346,200, secured by a mortgage on real property located in Staten Island. In June 2010, the plaintiff, as the alleged holder of the note and successor in interest to the mortgagee, commenced this action to foreclose the mortgage, alleging that Jach had defaulted in making a payment due on February 1, 2010. In December 2012, upon denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting Jach's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the complaint, without prejudice, based on lack of standing.

Thereafter, in February 2014, the plaintiff commenced this action, again seeking to foreclose the subject mortgage. After interposing an answer, in which he alleged lack of standing as an affirmative defense, Jach moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, and the plaintiff cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the complaint. The Supreme Court referred the action to a referee to hear and report on the issue of standing. After conducting a hearing, the referee issued a report finding, in effect, that the plaintiff had failed to establish its standing for purposes of its cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

In October 2015, with this action still pending and the referee's report not yet confirmed, the plaintiff commenced an action in federal court seeking to foreclose the subject mortgage. Subsequently, in August 2016, the plaintiff moved before the Supreme Court, among other things, for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice, which Jach opposed.

In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, in effect, upon granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to discontinue the action, did so with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals.

The Supreme Court, in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to discontinue the action, should have done so without prejudice. Pursuant to CPLR 3217(b), "an action shall not be discontinued by a party asserting a claim except upon order of the court and upon terms and conditions, as the court deems proper." As a general rule, "a plaintiff should be permitted to discontinue an action without prejudice unless the defendant would be prejudiced thereby" (America's Residential Props., LLC v Lema, 118 AD3d 735, 736; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Fisch, 103 AD3d 622, 622-623; Urbonowicz v Yarinsky, 290 AD2d 922, 923). Here, there was no evidence that Jach would be prejudiced by a discontinuance (see America's Residential Props., LLC v Lema, 118 AD3d at 736; cf. Kaplan v Village of Ossining, 35 AD3d 816, 817; DuBray v Warner Bros. Records, 236 AD2d 312, 314). Also, contrary to Jach's contention, the parties were not required, under the circumstances of this case, to stipulate to the discontinuance of the action (see CPLR 3217[b]; Mahaffey v Mahaffey, 52 AD2d 1039, 1040)."

OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR AIRBNB FINE

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Richard Breslaw Family LP v. NYC Dep't of Bldgs, NYLJ February 26, 2020,  Date filed: 2020-02-14, Court: Supreme Court, New York, Judge: Justice Laurence Love, Case Number: 152499/2019:


"......One who objects to the act of an administrative agency must exhaust all available administrative remedies before being permitted to litigate in a court of law (see Lehigh Portland Cement Co v. NY State Dept of Envtl Conservation, 87 NY2d 136, 140 [1995]). Per 48 RCNY §6-19(a)(1)(iii), before appealing, petitioner was required to pay the penalties imposed on it by hearing officer Roake’s Order. Petitioner failed to perfect an appeal of OATH hearing officer Roake’s decision and order because petitioner did not submit proof of payment of the penalty imposed or a waiver from OATH of prior payment due to financial hardship.


As petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies by not perfecting a proper and timely appeal, the Court finds this matter should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

If the Court was considering the merits of said petition, the Court notes that petitioner alleges OATH’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. In deciding whether an agency’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, courts are limited to an assessment of whether a rational basis exists for the administrative determination and their review ends when a rational basis has been found (see Heintz v. Brown, 80 NY2d 998, 1001 [1992]). An action or determination is arbitrary if it was made without sound basis in reason and without regard to the facts (id. at 1001).

Petitioner represents it was the tenant who operated the subject premises as an illegal short-term rental of the two units within their property. This is not a defense to the violations charged in the 2018 summonses. Courts have also upheld a building owner’s non-delegable responsibility to maintain its building in a code-compliant manner and found building owners vicariously liable for breaching this obligation (see Guzman v. Haven Plaza Housing Dev Fund Co, 69 NY2d 559 [1987]).


Petitioner admits that as early as November 2017, when it was issued the November 2017 summons, that it was aware of the use of the subject premises for short-term rental. Petitioner waited four months to commence eviction proceedings against the offending tenant and offered no proof that any of the violations had been corrected.


The subject premise is classified for permanent residence, and violations of the building code occurred when the apartments were illegally converted into short-term rental units as advertised on AirBNB. The hearing officers properly applied the appropriate building code violations and did not make an arbitrary nor capricious decision."



MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE: TRIAL MOD DID NOT REVIVE DEBT

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The Third Department held otherwise in a similar matter but, depending on the language in the trial modification, this would be the rule in the Second Department

Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Dorsin 2020 NY Slip Op 01354 Decided on February 26, 2020 Appellate Division, Second Department:

"An action to foreclose a mortgage is governed by a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213[4]; Ditech Fin., LLC v Naidu, 175 AD3d 1387). Even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt (see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Craig, 169 AD3d 627, 629; Kashipour v Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB, 144 AD3d 985, 986). Here, the mortgage debt was accelerated on April 23, 2009, when GreenPoint commenced the 2009 action and elected in the complaint to accelerate the debt (see Pennymac Corp. v McGlade, 176 AD3d 963, 965). The instant action was commenced on October 29, 2015, more than six years later.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff contends that the defendant's execution of a Home Affordable Modification Trial Period Plan (hereinafter the Plan) after commencement of the 2009 action, as well as payments made pursuant to that Plan, served to renew the running of the statute of limitations, thus making this action timely, as it was commenced less than six years after the Plan was executed and the payments made.

" General Obligations Law § 17-101 effectively revives a time-barred claim when the debtor has signed a writing which validly acknowledges the debt'" (Yadegar v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 164 AD3d 945, 947, quoting Lynford v Williams, 34 AD3d 761, 762). "The writing, in order to constitute an acknowledgment, must recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay it" (Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d 516, 521; see Yadegar v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 164 AD3d at 947). "In order to demonstrate that the statute of limitations has been renewed by a partial payment, it must be shown that the payment was accompanied by circumstances amounting to an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise may be inferred to pay the remainder'" (U.S. Bank N.A. v Martin, 144 AD3d 891, 892-893, quoting Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d at 521; see General Obligations Law § 17-107; Petito v Piffath, 85 NY2d 1, 9).

Here, under the Plan, which the defendant admitted having executed, the defendant represented, among other things, that he was unable to afford his mortgage payments, and agreed to make three trial payments, at a reduced rate, over the course of three months. If the defendant complied, and his representations continued to be true, then the Plan provided that the defendant would be offered a permanent modification agreement. Modifications pursuant to the Home Affordable Mortgage Program can include interest rate reduction, principal forbearance, and principal forgiveness (see US Bank N.A. v Sarmiento, 121 AD3d 187, 198). In this case, the defendant made all of the trial payments but was not offered a permanent modification agreement.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Plan did not constitute an "unconditional and unqualified acknowledgment of [the] debt" sufficient to reset the statute of limitations (Hakim v Peckel Family Ltd. Partnership, 280 AD2d 645; see Yadegar v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 164 AD3d at 947). While the writing arguably acknowledged the existence of indebtedness, the defendant merely agreed to make three trial payments so as to receive a permanent modification offer. Any intention to repay the debt was conditioned on the parties reaching a permanent modification agreement, which condition did not occur. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the writing contained "nothing inconsistent with an intention on the part of the debtor to pay" the debt (Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d at 521; see [*3]Sotheby's, Inc. v Mao, 173 AD3d 72, 81; Hakim v Peckel Family Ltd. Partnership, 280 AD2d 645; National Westminster Bank USA v Petito, 202 AD2d 193, 195; Sichol v Crocker, 177 AD2d 842, 843; Flynn v Flynn, 175 AD2d 51, 52; cf. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Bissessar, 172 AD3d 983, 985; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Kess, 159 AD3d 767, 768-769). Indeed, the defendant represented in the Plan that he was unable to afford the mortgage payments.

Similarly, contrary to the plaintiff's further contention and the Supreme Court's conclusion, the trial payments made pursuant to the Plan did not constitute an absolute and unqualified acknowledgment by the debtor of more being due, from which a promise could be inferred to pay the remainder. Rather, the payments were made for the purpose of reaching an agreement to modify the terms of the parties' contract (cf. Petito v Piffath, 85 NY2d at 9; Lew Morris Demolition Co. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 40 NY2d at 521-522), and any promise to pay the remainder of the debt that could be inferred in such circumstances would merely be a promise conditioned upon the parties reaching a mutually satisfactory modification agreement (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Martin, 144 AD3d at 893). Just as an express conditional promise or acknowledgment does not serve to reset the statute of limitations, an implied conditional promise also does not have that effect. Although the Appellate Division, Third Department, held to the contrary in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Grover (165 AD3d 1541), we disagree and decline to follow that holding.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and for an order of reference, and should have granted those branches of the defendant's cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred and for summary judgment on his counterclaim to cancel and discharge of record the mortgage pursuant to RPAPL 1501(4) (see BH 263, LLC v Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 175 AD3d 1375, 1376; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Bissessar, 172 AD3d at 985).

Lastly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for summary judgment on his counterclaim for an award of attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to Real Property Law § 282 (see 21st Mtge. Corp. v Nweke, 165 AD3d 616, 619)."

CHILD SUPPORT WHEN CUSTODY IS SHARED

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Alliger-Bograd v Bograd, 2020 NY Slip Op 01315, Decided on February 26, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in determining the amount of his child support obligation based on the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter CSSA) guidelines, as the parties have shared custody of the children, and that the parties should split all child support obligations evenly. The CSSA "sets forth a formula for calculating child support by applying a designated statutory percentage, based upon the number of children to be supported, to combined parental income up to a particular ceiling" (Matter of Murray v Murray, 164 AD3d 1451, 1453 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Where the combined parental income exceeds that ceiling, the court, in fixing the basic child support obligation on income over the ceiling, has the discretion to apply the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(f), or to apply the statutory percentages, or to apply both" (Candea v Candea, 173 AD3d at 664; see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][c][3]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 655). In Bast v Rossoff (91 NY2d 723, 728), the Court of Appeals held that the CSSA was applicable to shared custody arrangements. The CSSA is also applicable to situations where each party has equal custodial time with the children (see Baraby v Baraby, 250 AD2d 201, 204). In cases where custody is shared equally, the parent having the greater share of the support obligation after applying the statutory formula is identified as the "noncustodial" parent for the purposes of support (see id. at 204). However, if the statutory formula "yields a result that is unjust or inappropriate," the court "can resort to the paragraph (f)' factors and order payment of an amount that is just and appropriate" (Bast v Rossoff, 91 NY2d at 729, citing Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][f], [g]; see Baraby v Baraby, 250 AD2d at 204). Here, the court appropriately applied the CSSA to determine the award of child support, and we find no basis to disturb the court's determination."

CHILD CUSTODY - A TRIAL AND REVISING A PRIOR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ORDER

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE - POST JUDGMENT ACTIONS TO SET ASIDE FORECLOSURE

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Besides an appeal from the judgment of foreclosure and sale, some homeowners have tried other approaches to set aside the foreclosure. Here are two recent examples that failed.

In Monterosso v Garguilo, 2020 NY Slip Op 01488, Decided on March 4, 2020. Appellate Division, Second Department  - the homeowners commenced an action, inter alia, to impose a constructive trust upon certain real property to which they lost title in a previous foreclosure action, and for a judgment declaring that the referee's deed transferring title to the property to the defendants was void as the product of a usurious loan transaction. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted the motion. The Second Department affirmed.



In Pusey v Morales, 2020 NY Slip Op 01519, Decided on March 4, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department, after the foreclosure judgment and sale, the homeowner commenced an action against the bank and another defendant, seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the assignment of mortgage was null and void and to remove the cloud on title to the premises. The court held that:

""[A] judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all questions at issue between the parties, and concludes all matters of defense which were or might have been litigated in the foreclosure action" (SSJ Dev. of Sheepshead Bay I, LLC v Amalgamated Bank, 128 AD3d at 675 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus, subsequent claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata where, as here, the granting of the requested relief "in the present action would destroy or impair the rights established by the judgment of foreclosure in the prior action" (id. at 675-676; see Chapman Steamer Collective, LLC v KeyBank N.A., 163 AD3d 760, 761-762)."


AN ORAL DOMESTIC PARTNER AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE

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Breaking up is hard to do.

Sheinker v Quick, 2020 NY Slip Op 20049, Decided on February 6, 2020, Appellate Term, Second Department:

"In this action, plaintiff seeks to recover the principal sum of $15,000, based on causes of action for breach of contract and fraudulent concealment or fraudulent inducement. In the complaint, plaintiff asserted that she had resided in New York with her two children and with defendant, in a domestic relationship, for several years when, in April 2015, defendant had received an offer of employment in Florida. Plaintiff alleged that, since defendant lacked the financial means to relocate to Florida, the parties had made an oral contract (the Agreement), pursuant to which plaintiff had agreed to pay defendant's expenses to relocate from New York to Florida and the majority of his living expenses for a year, in consideration of defendant's payment to plaintiff of 80% of his net earnings for the same period. Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff paid defendant's moving expenses, which she estimated at approximately $15,000, rented and furnished an apartment in Florida, and obtained utility contracts and renter's insurance for the Florida apartment in her name, among other expenses. Plaintiff and her children continued to reside in New York. Defendant went to work in Florida, following which plaintiff began receiving payments in furtherance of the Agreement, initially, by ATM withdrawals that she made from defendant's bank account, and, after several weeks, by wire transfers that defendant made into plaintiff's bank account.

Plaintiff stated that, on June 27, 2015, she became aware that defendant had breached the Agreement by concealing a portion of his earnings from her and paying her less than the amount [*2]to which she was entitled. Subsequently, she learned that defendant had also concealed from her his romantic involvement with a woman in Florida, to whom he had become engaged before he had entered into the Agreement, as well as a prior criminal conviction and a civil judgment that had been rendered against defendant based on fraud. Plaintiff indicated that, had she been aware of defendant's romantic involvement with another woman or his prior financial malfeasance, she would not have entered into the Agreement with defendant.

Defendant denied liability, and, following discovery, moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting, first, that since plaintiff admitted to having received payments from defendant that exceeded the $15,000 she seeks to recover in this action, she had no viable claim for relief, and second, that plaintiff's cause of action for fraudulent inducement was barred because it was essentially duplicative of her cause of action for breach of contract.

In opposition, plaintiff stated that, although she had only demanded $15,000, because it is the jurisdictional limit for actions brought in the District Court, defendant's payments to her had not covered the full amount due, and his outstanding contractual debt to her exceeded that sum. With respect to her cause of action for fraudulent inducement, plaintiff indicated that she had entered into the Agreement based on the parties' history of living together in a familial relationship, and with the understanding that if defendant's job worked out in Florida, she and her children would join defendant and make Florida their primary residence. She stated that she had relied on the parties' confidential relationship when she had entered into the Agreement, and that, if defendant had not concealed his relationship with and engagement to the woman in Florida as well as his past record of financial malfeasance, she would not have entered into the Agreement. By order dated August 2, 2018, the District Court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the action, upon a sua sponte finding that plaintiff was, in effect, seeking "palimony," which is not recognized in New York.
While New York will not imply a contract pertaining to earnings and assets from the relationship of an unmarried couple living together, sometimes denominated "palimony," the express contract of such a couple is enforceable (see Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 484 [1980]; see also Dee v Rakower, 112 AD3d 204, 210-211 [2013]). Here, plaintiff pleaded the elements of a cause of action for breach of contract, including its existence, her performance under the contract, defendant's breach of his contractual obligations, and plaintiff's resulting damages (see 143 Bergen St., LLC v Ruderman, 144 AD3d 1002, 1003 [2016]). Consequently, the District Court erred in, sua sponte, dismissing the action on the ground that it constituted an unenforceable action for "palimony."

A plaintiff may, if she so chooses, seek a recovery in a court with a lower jurisdictional limit than the amount of her damages, provided that the plaintiff confines her demand to the court's jurisdictional limit (see Wallach v Flood, 54 Misc 3d 127[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51789[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016]). Here, plaintiff alleged contract damages substantially in excess of the sum which defendant had paid her. The fact that she had confined her demand to the jurisdictional limit of the District Court did not provide a valid basis for the dismissal of the action.

By alleging in the complaint that the parties were in a confidential relationship at the time they entered into the Agreement (see Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 [1976]; Mei Yun Chen v Mei Wan Kao, 97 AD3d 730 [2012]), from which it could be inferred that defendant had [*3]a duty to disclose any material information (cf. Sanford/Kissena Owners Corp. v Daral Props., LLC, 84 AD3d 1210, 1211 [2011]; Manti's Transp., Inc. v C.T. Lines, Inc., 68 AD3d 937, 940 [2009]), and that defendant had concealed facts from her—to wit, his engagement to another woman and his prior history of financial fraud—which were collateral to the Agreement but the concealment of which served as an inducement for plaintiff to enter into the Agreement, plaintiff pleaded a cause of action for fraudulent inducement which was not duplicative of her cause of action for breach of contract (see Greenberg v Meyreles, 155 AD3d 1001, 1003 [2017]). Since, in his motion, defendant failed to provide evidentiary materials to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]) or otherwise to establish his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, his motion should have been denied."

HOSPITAL VISITING RIGHTS OF DOMESTIC PARTNER

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Here, the domestic partner was not the designated health care proxy and it appears that the plaintiff and the blood relatives of the patient were at odds. A notice of appeal has been filed.

DELISI v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2020 NY Slip Op 30350, Supreme Court, NY County, February 4, 2020:

Plaintiff Suzanne Delisi, who was the life partner of Louis Bradford Paar, commenced this action against the defendant Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center based on its alleged refusal to allow plaintiff to visit Mr. Paar while he was hospitalized at the defendant's facility from January 25, 2018 until his death in February 2018. In her complaint, plaintiff asserts three causes of action against defendant: (1) violation of Public Health Law § 2805-q; (2) tortious interference with contract; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant now moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Public Health Law § 2805-q provides that "[n]o domestic partner ... shall be denied any rights of visitation of his or her domestic partner ... when such rights are accorded to spouses and next-of-kin at any hospital, nursing home or health care facility." Defendant argues that they are immunized from liability under Public Health Law § 2986(1), which provides that "[n]o health care provider or employee thereof shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability ... for honoring in good faith a health care decision by an agent...." According to defendant, the hospital employees were acting pursuant to the directives of Mr. Paar's health care proxy and, in any event, Public Health Law § 2805-q does not give plaintiff a private right of action.

Public Health Law § 2805-q does not expressly permit recovery by a domestic partner for damages based on the alleged improper denial of visitation rights. "Consequently, recovery may be had only if a legislative intent to create such a right of action is fairly implied in the statutory provision and its legislative history. Haar v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2019 N.Y. Slip. Op. 08445, 2019 WL 6183610, at *2 (2019) (holding that Public Health Law § 230(11)(b) does not imply a private right of action to a physician based on alleged lack of good faith in reporting misconduct) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Courts consider three essential factors in determining whether a private right of action can be implied from a statute and its legislative history: "(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme."Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). All three factors must be satisfied before an implied private right of action will be recognized. Id.
With respect to the first factor, plaintiff alleges she is a "domestic partner" in her complaint. Based on the plain text of the statute and its legislative history, the legislature made clear that the provision was intended to protect domestic partners and patients against discrimination by affording them with the same visitation rights as those afforded to patients and their spouses. (Sponsor's Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2004, ch 471).

With respect to the second factor, "whether recognition of a private right would promote the legislative purpose" of the statute, the answer is less clear. Obviously, giving domestic partners the right to bring a private cause of action under this statute would help ensure that their visitation rights are not improperly denied. However, the parties did not cite any statute or case permitting the spouse or next of kin of a patient to recover damages based on the hospital's refusal to permit visitation and the court's independent research resulted in no such statute or case. Since the stated purpose of the statute was to prevent discriminatory practices, giving such rights to domestic partners where no such rights are available to a patient's spouse or next of kin would not promote the legislative purpose of the statute.

Finally, the third factor of the analysis, "whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme," also militates against recognition of an implied right of action. The Public Health Law explicitly confers a private right of action to patients based on the alleged denial of "any right or benefit," including, notably, the patient's right to authorize those family members and other adults who will be given priority to visit. Public Health Law §§ 2801d(1) and 2803-c(3)(o). These two sections explicitly give patients the right to sue for damages for the alleged deprivation of a patient's rights or benefits. See Zeides v. Hebrew Home, 300 A.D.2d 178, 179 (1st Dep't 2002). By contrast, Public Health Law § 2805-q does not include explicit language granting domestic partners the right to sue for damages "and none may be judicially engrafted."DeCintio v. Lawrence Hosp., 299 A.D.2d 165, 166 (1st Dep't 2002) (citing Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 205, 208 (1976); holding that Public Health Law 29-C does not permit recovery by a health care proxy for his individual damages); see also McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes §§ 240, 310(c).[1] Moreover, even if plaintiff could sue for damages under the statute, Public Health Law § 2986(1) immunizes defendant from any liability for honoring the directives of a patient's health care proxy, as plaintiff admits occurred in this case. Complaint, ¶ 69. Thus, the first cause of action must be dismissed as it does not afford plaintiff with a private cause of action for damages against the hospital.

In the second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendant tortuously interfered with her alleged agreement with Mr. Paar whereby plaintiff and Mr. Paar allegedly agreed that plaintiff would manage Mr. Paar's medical and financial affairs. Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 86. In order to state a claim for tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must plead that its contract with a third party has been breached. NBT Bancorp Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, 87 N.Y.2d 614 (1996). Here, plaintiff has not pled the basic elements of her contract with Mr. Paar as she fails to set forth what consideration was provided by Mr. Paar in exchange for plaintiff's alleged agreement to manage his affairs. Moreover, plaintiff has not pled that the defendant's actions caused Mr. Paar to breach any such alleged agreement, which is required to state a claim for tortious interference with contract. See Farkas v. River House Realty Co., 173 A.D.3d 405, 406 (1st Dep't 2019). Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed.

Finally, plaintiff's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress must also be dismissed as the pleading falls short of the extreme and outrageous conduct required to support this claim, particularly given plaintiff's admission in her allegations that defendant was acting pursuant to the wishes of Mr. Paar's health care proxy. Brankov v. Hazzard, 142 A.D.3d 445, 447 (1st Dep't 2016).

COVID -19 AND THE NEW YORK FEDERAL COURTS


COMMENTS AND SPAM

MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE - AGAIN THE EVIDENCE RULES APPLY IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

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American Home Mtge. Servicing, Inc. v Carnegie, 2020 NY Slip Op 01590, Decided on March 11, 2020, Appellate Division, Second Department:

"We agree with the Supreme Court's determination, upon reargument, that the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that it had standing, as the plaintiff's asserted basis in its May 2016 motion—that standing was established through an affidavit of an employee of the plaintiff's current loan sub-servicer—is without merit (see Citibank, N.A. v Cabrera, 130 AD3d 861, 861; see also US Bank N.A. v Hunte, 176 AD3d 894, 896). The affidavit failed to lay the requisite foundation under the business records exception to the hearsay rule to support the admissibility of the records relied upon by the affiant for her assertion that the note was transferred to the plaintiff's custodian prior to the commencement of the action and remained in the possession of the plaintiff's custodian at the time of commencement (see US Bank N.A. v Hunte, 176 AD3d at 896; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Mercius, 138 AD3d 650, 651-652). Moreover, the affiant's assertions as to the contents of the records were inadmissible without the submission of the records themselves (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Elshiekh, 179 AD3d 1017; Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Gordon, 171 AD3d 197, 205)."

UPDATED PROTOCOL FOR NY COURTS

FOR THIS HEALTH CRISIS......

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The New York Health Care Proxy Law allows you to appoint someone you trust — for example, a family member or close friend – to make health care decisions for you if you lose the ability to make decisions yourself.

This can be done without an attorne, you just need 2 independent witnesses, although it may be a good idea to consult with an attorney. Here is a link to the form and instructions:

https://www.health.ny.gov/publications/1430.pdf

FOR THIS HEALTH CRISIS - NYS SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN DEBTS

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From Governor Cuomo:

"Governor Andrew M. Cuomo and Attorney General Letitia James today announced that — effective immediately — the state will temporarily halt the collection of medical and student debt owed to the State of New York and referred to the Office of the Attorney General for collection, for at least a 30-day period, in response to growing financial impairments resulting from the spread of 2019 novel coronavirus, or COVID-19. Countless New Yorkers have been impacted — directly or indirectly — by the spread of COVID-19, forcing them to forgo income and business. In an effort to support these workers and families and ease their financial burdens, the OAG will halt the collection of medical and student debt owed to the State of New York and referred to the OAG for collection from March 16, 2020 through April 15, 2020. After this 30-day period, the OAG will reassess the needs of state residents for a possible extension. Additionally, the OAG will accept applications for suspension of all other types of debt owed to the State of New York and referred to the OAG for collection.
"As the financial impact of this emerging crisis grows, we are doing everything we can to support the thousands of New Yorkers that are suffering due to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic," Governor Cuomo said. "This new action to temporarily suspend the collection of debt owed to the state will help mitigate the adverse financial impact of the outbreak on individuals, families, communities and businesses in New York State, as we continue to do everything we can to slow the spread of the virus." 
"In this time of crisis, my office will not add undue stress or saddle New Yorkers with unnecessary financial burden," said Attorney General James. "New Yorkers need to focus on keeping themselves safe and healthy from the coronavirus, and therefore can rest assured that state medical and student debt referred to my office will not be collected against them for at least 30 days. This is the time when New Yorkers need to rally around each other and pick each other up, which is why I am committed to doing everything in my power to support our state's residents."
The OAG collects certain debts owed to the State of New York via settlements and lawsuits brought on behalf of the State of New York and state agencies. A total of more than 165,000 matters currently fit the criteria for a suspension of state debt collection, including, but not limited to:
  • Patients that owe medical debt due to the five state hospitals and the five state veterans' home;
  • Students that owe student debt due to State University of New York campuses; and
  • Individual debtors, sole-proprietors, small business owners, and certain homeowners that owe debt relating to oil spill cleanup and removal costs, property damage, and breach of contract, as well as other fees owed to state agencies.
The temporary policy will also automatically suspend the accrual of interest and collection of fees on all outstanding state medical and student debt referred to the OAG for collection, so New Yorkers are not penalized for taking advantage of this program.
New Yorkers with non-medical or non-student debt owed to the State of New York and referred to the OAG, may also apply to temporarily halt the collection of state debt. Individuals seeking to apply for this temporary relief can fill out an application online or visit the OAG's coronavirus website to learn more about the suspension of payments. If an individual is unable to fill out the online form, they can also call the OAG hotline at 1-800-771-7755 to learn more." 

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